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In 1970, an essay by Robert Dahl appeared in the Yale University
Press' new Fastback series, reflecting on the nature of authority and legit-
imacy in a just society. What occasioned Professor Dahl's reflections
was the recurrent talk of revolution, the reflexive demand for "power to
the people," that slipped with surprising ease into political discourse dur-
ing the late 1960's and early 1970's. Professor Dahl wrote: "Strange as
it may seem to you, how to decide who legitimately make up 'the peo-
ple'-or rather a people-and hence are entitled to govern themselves in
their own association is a problem almost totally neglected by all the
great political philosophers who write about democracy." ' Professor
Dahl offered a framework for grappling with this fundamental question,
and other political theorists have taken up his implicit invitation and are
beginning to fill the void he identified. 2
Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith's 1985 Yale Fastback adds to
this genre.3 The book explores the specific issue of American political
membership, and its very setting shows how far we have come in ponder-
ing Dahl's question. The context is no longer revolution; rather, the
starting point for this inquiry is immigration, and specifically, illegal im-
migration. More people are on the move globally, to a more problematic
reception. Are they entitled to claim a share in the new association to
which they have moved, a right to join in the process of self-government?
Are they-and, more to the point, are their children-to be considered
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1. R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 60 (1970) (em-
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2. See, ag., M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUAL-
rTy 31-63 (1983); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 85-93 (1980); Mi-
NORITIES: COMMUNITY AND IDENTITY (C. Fried ed. 1983).
3. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITY (1985) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. The authors occasionally
even echo Dahl's formulation of the crucial issue. See, e.g., pp. 134-36.
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part of "the people," even though the laws adopted by the existing associ-
ation members attempt to forbid their very presence?
Professors Schuck and Smith are troubled by illegal immigration and
by the questions it raises concerning membership and legitimacy. 4
They-and we-should be. Their work addresses a genuine problem
that is likely to worsen in coming decades. The book opens up a useful
consideration of many issues that bedevil Americans, ambivalent as ever
about the control of immigration. The authors challenge their readers to
reflect more self-consciously than we ordinarily do upon national identity
and the appropriate or prudent means for accepting new members and
retaining old ones. Only in offering specific proposals for changes in the
rules governing the acquisition and termination of American citizenship
do they lose their sure-footedness, offering suggestions that are in fact
profoundly troubling.
I.
I shall begin with the book's most controversial point. Professors
Schuck and Smith argue that altering our citizenship rules would provide
one important measure to help control illegal migration. Instead of per-
petuating rules automatically assigning citizenship based on birth in U.S.
territory (which they label "birthright citizenship"), Congress should ex-
ercise its option-prospectively only-to recognize as citizens only those
children born here to citizens or legal permanent resident aliens. 5 Chil-
dren born to illegal aliens or to nonimmigrants (aliens present for only a
temporary sojourn) would not obtain U.S. citizenship despite birth in
American territory.
This will come as a surprising-even stunning-proposal to those who
had assumed that a strong jus soli rule6 is a fixed part of our constitu-
tional heritage.7 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."' 8 A divided Supreme Court in 1898 ruled that this constitutional
provision made Wong Kim Ark a citizen, based on his nativity in the
United States, even though his parents were Chinese nationals ineligible
4. Professor Schuck treated several of these themes from a somewhat different angle in
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1984).
5. Pp. 5-7, 116-22.
6. Jus soli refers to citizenship based on territory of birth, as opposed to jus sanguinis,
citizenship based on descent. See Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'L
L. 27-29 (special number 1929).
7. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 n.10 (1982) (dictum); 3 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 12.5-.6 (1985).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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for naturalization. 9 This landmark case has been widely understood as
adopting a near-universaljus soli rule as a matter of constitutional enti-
tlement. The qualifying language in the Fourteenth Amendment, recog-
nizing birthright citizenship only for persons born "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States, has been given little effect. Under the
common understanding, virtually the only class excluded consists of chil-
dren born to foreign ambassadors. 10
The book argues, however, that such a sweeping conclusion rests on
dictum alone. 1 The cases traditionally cited involved only claimants,
like Wong Kim Ark himself, who were born to aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, not to illegal aliens or nonimmigrants. If the
common understanding rests only on dictum, then a court might well
have to decide the question anew. Professors Schuck and Smith review
the congressional debates on the issue at the time Congress adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, and make the case for reading those rather con-
fused proceedings as embracing the more limited position.' 2 In their
view, "subject to the jurisdiction" means wholly subject, that is, subject
as a lawful permanent resident or citizen. Only in that setting does the
Constitution, of its own force, manifest the polity's consent to the alien
parents' presence on terms that include the capacity to bestow citizenship
on children born during their stay. If Congress wishes to go further in
extending birthright citizenship, it certainly may; this accounts for the
last hundred years' administrative practice with respect to the children of
nonimmigrants and illegal aliens. But Congress should recognize that
such extension is a matter of grace, not right, to be exercised in the fu-
ture, if at all, with greater awareness of the explicit choices that are
open. 13
Dictum so widely repeated and, apparently, so easily accepted by
nearly all Americans may deserve more respect than the authors give it.
I accept that it is dictum, however, and that the legislative history of the
1866 debates stops well short of an express embrace of the near-universal
birthright citizenship rule now being implemented. Yet this only opens
9. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
10. For a complete description of excluded categories, see 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, supra note 7, § 12.6. The Supreme Court also decided, some 16 years after enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that Indians, as members of dependent nations (Indian tribes), do
not come within the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship provision even though born within
the territory of the United States. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). Congress has since
extended statutory citizenship to all such Indians. See Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, §301(b), 8 U.S.C. §1401(b) (1982).






the inquiry. If the question is to be examined anew, why disturb such a
settled and accepted practice? What is to be gained?
In part, the authors' answer rests on the philosophical exploration to
be canvassed in the next section: citizenship should result from and re-
flect mutual consent, not automatic imputation based merely on the acci-
dent of place of birth. In larger measure, their answer seems to rest on
certain instrumental policy calculations. We are faced, they accurately
point out, with an illegal alien problem of unprecedented dimensions.
Moreover, the continuing growth of the welfare state magnifies its im-
pact. 14 Today, illegal presence means not only the opportunity to work
and enjoy the economic fruits of one's labors, but also entitlement to
various services and supports. Although legislatures have tried to cut
back on welfare-state benefits for illegal aliens, those restrictions are
often weakened or circumvented if the household contains a citizen
child. 15 Changing the birthright citizenship rules would contribute to-
ward solving the underlying problem of allocation of limited resources by
drying up one possible source of attraction.
I am skeptical that an expanding welfare state accounts .in any signifi-
cant degree for the growth of illegal migration. 16 I am especially dubi-
ous that the birthright citizenship rules contribute much to this growth.
Professors Schuck and Smith, however, are careful not to oversell their
case. They argue only that birthright citizenship rules provide some ad-
ded incentive, operative at the margin. 17 And they quote one estimate
placing the level of births to illegal aliens in this country at the surpris-
ingly high level of 75,000 per year.' 8
Even assuming that the attractions of birthright citizenship are signifi-
cant, one must still wonder about the choice of this particular proposal as
any part of a strategy for addressing the problem of illegal migration. To
be sure, Professors Schuck and Smith do not propose a change in citizen-
ship rules as the only element in such a strategy. From the beginning of
the book, they emphasize that this is only one of four policy changes that
should be implemented. The others are "more effective enforcement of
existing immigration laws; . . . a system of realistic, credible employer
14. Pp. 3-4, 95.
15. Pp. 111-12; see, e.g., Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Darces v.
Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807, 679 P.2d 458 (1984).
16. Analysts have hotly debated the extent of welfare usage by illegal migrants. See, e.g.,
T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 782-87 (1985) (quoting
discussion in the Staff Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy);
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND
BACKGROUND ON LEGALIZATION 64-86 (Comm. Print 1985).
17. Pp. 94, 104.
18. P. 95.
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sanctions to remove the chief incentive to most illegal immigration; [and]
. . . more generous legal admission policies, especially within this hemi-
sphere .. ."19 Because these other three possibilities are more familiar
proposals (as any follower of Congress' recent struggles with the Simp-
son-Mazzoli bills 20 will recognize), the authors understandably devote
their attention in this book to the new element.
But why add this element? If the other three measures (especially the
first two) are reasonably successful, far fewer children will be born to
illegal aliens, and the membership problem the authors identify will vir-
tually disappear. This is especially the case because their proposal would
not apply the new citizenship rules retroactively.
More importantly, consider what happens if the new citizenship rules
are adopted, but the other measures either are not implemented or fail to
have an appreciable impact on new illegal migration. From the date of
the change onward, we would find a growing class of people who were
born and raised in the United States but who do not have, and presuma-
bly cannot easily obtain, U.S. citizenship. What would be the conse-
quences? What would be the effect on their attitudes toward the country
in which they live? What effect would this new and unfortunate status
have on the attitudes of citizens, not only toward this new class but to-
ward other "aliens" present?
These are not abstract questions. Many European countries are now
struggling with the so-called problem of the second generation.2' Those
countries imported foreign workers during the boom years of the 1950's
and 1960's. It was assumed that such "guests" came on a temporary
basis and would leave should the need for their labor disappear. When
the 1973 oil crisis forced a halt in new importation of guest workers,
however, governments were surprised at how few longtime workers re-
turned home voluntarily. When the lawmakers decided, in most cases,
19. P. 5.
20. This immigration reform legislation was named for its principal sponsors in the Senate
and the House respectively. Both chambers passed a version of the bill during the 98th Con-
gress, but failed to reconcile their differences before the Congress adjourned in October 1984.
See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 16, at xxii-xxiii. The Senate passed a slightly
pared down reform measure in 1985, S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S11750
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985), and the House Judiciary Committee is currently considering its own
version.
21. See, eg., M. MILLER & P. MARTIN, ADMINISTERING FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAMS:
LESSONS FROM EUROPE 73-92 (1982); J. POWER, MIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES (1979); Martin & Houstoun, European and American Immigration
Policies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 29; Hammar, Dual Citizenship and Polit-
ical Integration, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 438 (1985); Moulier-Boutang, Resistance to the
Political Representation of Alien Populations: The European Paradox, 19 INT'L MIGRATION
REv. 485 (1985); Castles, The Guests Who Stayed-The Debate on "Foreigners Policy" in the




not to compel those who had been present many years to leave, humanity
dictated that spouses and children be allowed to join the original mi-
grants. Over the years, those workers have produced children, born in
their parents' European country of residence, but without immediate citi-
zenship rights there, because broadly applicable birthright citizenship
rules are not in force.
Those children (many now adults) have known only life in Europe, but
in disturbingly large numbers resist identifying with it. Although natural-
ization is available, relatively few of the guest workers or their children
pursue it.22 This refusal has persisted despite expanding governmental
efforts to encourage naturalization and integration by those who are now
guaranteed permanent residence, for as long as they wish to keep it, in
their adopted countries.23 Against this background, anti-foreigner polit-
ical parties have enjoyed increasing success.
In these circumstances, beset with a kind of "apartheid volontaire" that
resists new governmental programs and augurs continuing and deepening
problems for those polities, some European observers look with envy at
"la formidable machine assimilatrice de la socidtd amiricaine."24
Though the fabric of the United States is woven from diverse strands, the
country has been notably successful in encouraging newcomers, or at
least the children of newcomers, to identify closely with the polity.
There are problems, to be sure, but by and large they come to be seen as
problems to be solved within the polity, by Americans acting as Ameri-
cans. That assimilative capacity (which need not entail obliteration of
cultural heritage) represents a precious national asset, especially for so
large and diverse a country. Its existence and value are sometimes over-
looked because its maintenance has so far been relatively effortless. 25 We
have no European-style "second generation problem" here, in part be-
cause we cannot have second generation aliens. The children may have
dual citizenship, of course, and they are free to choose to make the other
allegiance their principal one. But if they stay here, a secure citizenship
status forms a basic foundation for the shaping of identity and involve-
ment in the polity. They are thereby encouraged to embrace life here as
full participants, not as half-hearted, standoffish "guests." Equally
22. See, e.g., Hammar, supra note 21, at 440-43.
23. See generally John, Ausldnderpolitik fffr Inldnder?-Zur konzeptionellen Weiterent-
wicklung der Integrationspolitik, 1985 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDERRECHT UND Aus-
LNDERPOLITIK 3.
24. Julliard, Comment on devient un "vrai" Francais, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Aug.
30-Sept. 5, 1985, reprinted in ACTUALITfS MIGRATIONS, Sept. 16, 1985, at 13.
25. See, e.g., A. MANN, THE ONE AND THE MANY: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
IDENTITY 46-96 (1979). For a stimulating and highly personal reflection on this process, see
generally R. RODRIGUEZ, THE HUNGER OF MEMORY (1981).
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important, other citizens are induced to treat them as coequal members
of the polity, not as intruders who stay too long.26
America's assimilative capacity rests on many bases, and perhaps it
would be unaffected by a change in our birthright citizenship rules. But I
wonder. Before tinkering with any part of the machinery that in combi-
nation gives us so beneficial a result, we ought to be far more certain than
the authors leave us that birthright citizenship rules are themselves a sig-
nificant part of the problem.
II.
This book offers more, however, than merely a set of prescriptions
meant to help master the problem of illegal migration. Its major contri-
bution comes from the authors' exploration and critique of widely ac-
cepted conceptions of citizenship, and beyond this, of the notions of
membership, community, and political identity each conception entails.
Professors Schuck and Smith accomplish this task in Chapters One
through Three with admirable brevity and considerable narrative skill.
As they present it, citizenship doctrine reflects two sharply differing
worldviews or principles. Their description builds not on the customary
dichotomy between jus soli and jus sanguinis, but on the contrast be-
tween ascriptive and consensual views of citizenship. Professors Schuck
and Smith explain:
In its purest form, the principle of ascription holds that one's political mem-
bership is entirely and irrevocably determined by some objective circum-
stance-in this case, birth within a particular sovereign's allegiance or
jurisdiction. According to this conception, human preferences do not affect
political membership; only the natural, immutable circumstances of one's
birth are considered relevant.
The principle of consent advances radically different premises. It holds
that political membership can result only from free individual choices. In
the consensualist view, the circumstances of one's origins may of course
influence one's preferences for political affiliation, but they need not do so
and in any event are not determinative.27
The heart of the book consists of the authors' review of these two con-
trasting conceptions, in pure and modified forms, particularly as they
26. There are, to be sure, vast differences between Europe's guest worker dilemma and this
country's illegal immigration dilemma. I invoke the European experience only to illustrate one
set of problems that might well result if Professors Schuck and Smith's proposals are





have competed in the shaping of American citizenship rules through leg-
islation and judicial decision.
The authors tracejus soli, or "birthright citizenship," the central as-
criptive principle, to its feudal roots. Originating as an assertion of royal
authority, it emphasized not only that all born within the realm, even to
alien parents, were subjects, but also that such allegiance was perpet-
ual.28 This ancient view, the accepted vision of the English common law,
poses problems. For example, it cannot resolve competing claims,
should there be a direct confrontation, concerning the nationality of a
child born to alien parents. One sovereign might claim allegiance based
on jus soli, while the other might make a similarly absolute claim using
the equally ascriptive doctrine ofjus sanguinis.29
Even more objectionably, irrevocable ascription restricts individual
freedom by denying a right of voluntary expatriation. During the nine-
teenth century, this feature of the doctrine provoked repeated clashes be-
tween the United States and England. The British insisted on a right to
impress into their military service young men who had been born in the
kingdom but whom the United States regarded as its own naturalized
citizens. 30 The ascriptive principle also posed acute problems for Ameri-
can judges struggling to interpret U.S. citizenship law, then largely un-
codified. Several American decisions bear witness to the tension between
the common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance and the homegrown
assertion that American freedoms must embrace a right to renounce citi-
zenship. 31 Most judicial holdings inclined toward the former view32 until
the Expatriation Act of 186833 settled the question in favor of the indi-
vidual's right to withdraw consent. Professors Schuck and Smith help-
fully trace the contours and evolution of the ascriptive principle and
describe its advantages and disadvantages. Especially useful is their close
evaluation of representative adherents of the ascriptive view: Coke,
Filmer, Blackstone (to a lesser extent), and the authors of several nine-
teenth-century American court decisions.34
The consensual principle of citizenship has obvious links to basic dem-
ocratic ideas concerning consent of the governed and individual free-
dom-principles familiar in America since the Declaration of






33. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
34. Pp. 9-22, 42-63.
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still further to certain Enlightenment thinkers and Puritan revolution-
aries. As they explain, these writers "hoped to revitalize their world by
placing political society on a new, explicitly consensual footing, which
would erode the authority of the feudal elites and infuse all social institu-
tions with a responsiveness to current ideas and needs and to what they
took to be the natural rights of mankind. ' 35 Again, Professors Schuck
and Smith trace the evolution of these ideas by close attention to certain
representative adherents-principally Locke and Godwin in an early
chapter and later Burlamaqui and Vattel.36 They explore each theorist's
efforts to explain the sources and duration of citizenship obligations, to
account for the relation of political membership to other sorts of mem-
bership (principally within the family), and to overcome certain theoreti-
cal problems (such as the question of the membership of children and
whether "tacit consent" adequately accounts for the affiliations and obli-
gations of members upon attaining majority).
Crucial to Professors Schuck and Smith's discussion and their propo-
sal with respect to illegal aliens is the notion that consent is mutual. The
consent principle, in its purest form, means not only individual freedom
to withdraw consent from a polity and hence terminate membership, but
also the polity's authority to refuse membership to individuals and per-
haps even to withdraw it from members who fail to live up to certain
requirements or expectations. Although Professors Schuck and Smith
apparently consider this notion central to the consensualist vision, they
candidly point out that many of the consensualist writers they review did
not clearly embrace this conclusion. Most were preoccupied with the
practical and conceptual difficulties that consensualism posed from the
point of view of the individual and avoided the question of whether soci-
ety maintained an equivalent and reciprocal power.3 7
Although it is evident from the earliest pages of the book that the au-
thors decidedly favor the consensual principle, they are careful to outline
its disadvantages. For example, the sensitive, touchy, sovereign individ-
ual portrayed by Godwin, always ready to take offense at some societal
action and hasten into a withdrawal of consent, hardly presents an at-
tractive (or even realistic) image. In its extreme forms, Professors
35. Pp. 10-11.
36. Pp. 22-52.
37. Pp. 26-31, 47, 62. Professors Schuck and Smith briefly mention a group of writers in
the tradition of "Atlantic Republicanism," including Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Harrington,
Their works are far more congenial to the mutual consent notion, as they were deeply con-
cerned about preserving the homogeneity and cohesion of democratic polities. They consid-
ered, however, that such cohesion-and hence democracy-could be achieved only in small




Schuck and Smith thus point out, consensualism tends toward a "nar-
row, dessicated rationalism" that ignores affective attachments to family,
community, and state. 38 Moreover, by keeping questions of affiliation
and loyalty continually open to question, aggressive consensualism po-
tentially undermines the stability and legitimacy of any social
institution.39
The governmental power to withhold or withdraw consent also carries
disadvantages. Although it can be employed affirmatively, to further co-
hesion or patriotism, or to shape the community in accordance with its
members' beliefs and preferences,4° it can also find troubling uses. The
book properly portrays in this light two disheartening historical episodes:
the exclusion of Indians from U.S. citizenship4 l under the Supreme
Court's decision in Elk v. Wilkins 42 and of blacks43 under Dred Scott v.
Sanford.44 Both actions were justified by versions of consensualist the-
ory. Moreover, if consent is not a one-time-only phenomenon, the con-
sent principle in pure form doubtless entails a governmental right to
withdraw consent and involuntarily expatriate individuals whose behav-
ior is disapproved. As the authors acknowledge, the Supreme Court, af-
ter years of division and confusion, finally struck down all such
involuntary expatriations in Afroyim v. Rusk 45 and Vance v. Ter-
razas46-cases usually regarded as enlightened advances in the protec-
tion of individual rights. 47 Professors Schuck and Smith discuss these
troubling elements of consensualist theory and forthrightly recognize
"consensualism's exclusionary, repressive potential. ' 48
III.
One would wish that the authors maintained the same evenhandedness
in their policy prescriptions. To be sure, some features of their proposal
for changes in the law bear the mark of compromise, in order to over-
come consensualism's more problematic implications. Nonetheless the
38. P. 38.
39. Pp. 34-36, 38. Some of the concern here derives from the related possibility that citi-
zens will expatriate precisely at the time when the polity has the greatest need for them-that
is, in times of war or other national crisis. See pp. 32, 48, 60-61.
40. P. 36.
41. Pp. 83-84; see also pp. 63-66.
42. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
43. Pp. 66-71.
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
45. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
46. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
47. Pp. 87, 125.
48. P. 63.
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two central features of their proposal remain so troublesome that only an
unexpected swerve into a rather dogmatic consensualism can account for
them. This is especially surprising in a book otherwise usually marked
by balance and sound judgment.
The first major element of the authors' proposed policy is the denial of
automatic citizenship to children born here to illegal aliens. Such a
change would better honor society's right to consent-or not-to the
membership of newcomers. Illegal migration, the authors reason, consti-
tutes a "convulsive violation of consensually based political commu-
nity."49 I accept the characterization and the seriousness of the problem.
As indicated above, however, the practical disadvantages that accom-
pany attempts to address this issue through citizenship rules are so over-
whelming that they should remove this option from consideration.
The second major element in Professors Schuck and Smith's policy
proposal is designed to honor more completely the individual's right to
grant or withhold consent, by "render[ing] the right of expatriation more
meaningful." 50 Although one can now choose to expatriate, Professors
Schuck and Smith believe the process is not sufficiently accessible. Ordi-
narily one must travel overseas to renounce American citizenship. In
addition, the renouncer may have difficulty finding another country of
residence once his automatic right to U.S. residence has been forsworn
along with citizenship. The authors would change this by establishing
procedures for renunciation in this country and allowing renouncers to
remain here indefinitely as permanent resident aliens. Even more point-
edly, Professors Schuck and Smith would mandate a notice to all citizens
upon reaching eighteen, specifically informing them of this right of expa-
triation.51 The notice, however, would "stress the implications of such a
choice,"'52 presumably meaning the negative consequences. If the indi-
vidual did nothing, U.S. citizenship would continue.
Here too, pragmatic concerns about the consequences of such a proce-
dure simply cry out for greater attention. A fair weighing would find
49. P. 3.
50. P. 122.
51. Indeed, at times they seem to say that all children, even those born to citizens or lawful
permanent resident aliens, would be considered only "provisional" citizens until the time of
their majority. See pp. 117-18. That terminology is not as threatening as it might appear,
however. It signifies no societal power to refuse graduation to more secure citizenship; it
merely reinforces the message that youth need not consider birthplace fully determinative of
the citizenship question. (The term also echoes the view of children's citizenship status
adopted by some of the consensualist writers, principally Burlamaqui and Vattel. See pp. 44-
47.) One leaves the provisional category, as I understand the proposal, simply by failing to




that the disadvantages overwhelm the supposed advantages. For exam-
ple, do we really want eighteen-year-olds to make such a portentious de-
cision? The context seems to encourage disaffiliation, especially since the
notice would arrive during a stage of development, adolescence, when the
recipients may be most disposed toward renunciation. This is not to say
that all should be coerced into staying, if they truly desire to expatriate.
The totally disaffected, however, already enjoy the expatriation option.
They need simply take the trouble to learn about the procedures and
then travel overseas to perform them. Surely the difficulties and expense
of such travel are more likely to impress on renouncers (young or old)
the realistic consequences of disaffiliation than does renunciation dressed
in the deceptively cost-free garb Professors Schuck and Smith would ap-
ply. Eighteen-year-olds not so completely disaffected ought instead to be
encouraged to find other outlets for their displeasure-for example, polit-
ical efforts meant to change the features of American life they dislike.5 3
Why they should be asked so bluntly to consider exit before most have
any extensive experience of a struggle for political change escapes me.
Moreover, what is an eighteen-year-old who chooses not to renounce
supposed to conclude from the experience? The argument for this proce-
dure apparently presupposes that explicit consent (or at least inertia
when one is told explicitly that withdrawal is now possible) will some-
how tighten the bonds of cohesion that link citizen and polity. Whether
this is psychologically plausible is not extensively discussed. In any
event, consent and cohesion are more complicated phenomena.5 4
As a final pragmatic objection, why should renouncers retain residence
rights? Although this feature makes withdrawal of consent a more acces-
sible option from the individual's point of view, it seems unfair to the
polity. Professors Schuck and Smith's own premises about the mutual
right of consent, so weighty when they consider illegal aliens, include
societal authority to withhold consent to membership, at least under
some circumstances. If the individual has voluntarily withdrawn from
political membership, why should the polity be denied the right to refuse
further consent to the social membership represented by continued resi-
dence? The case for the polity's right here seems stronger than it does for
the children of illegal aliens. Moreover, permitting continued residence
threatens to compound the problem discussed above, by adding yet
53. For a stimulating exploration of the choice between political efforts (voice) and the exit
option in a wide variety of settings, see generally A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND LoY-
ALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1981).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
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another category to a growing class of disaffected residents ("alienated"
in the most literal sense).55
IV.
The authors' embrace of aggressively consensualist positions on these
matters is simply puzzling. Most of the time, they are refreshingly un-
dogmatic and candid, especially when describing the advantages and dis-
advantages of the ascriptive and consensual principles, or when
anticipating and discussing possible objections to their proposals. Even
the actual design of their policy prescriptions reflects an occasional ac-
ceptance of compromise-or "asymmetry," as they call it 56-which
would permit the survival of a few ascriptive practices. For example,
they reject involuntary expatriation visited by the government upon un-
willing citizens, thus accepting the nonconsensualist outcomes of Ter-
razas and Afroyim.5 7
For some reason, however, this pragmatism does not carry over into
the design and evaluation of the two central proposals. On these points,
the authors write as partisans of a consensualism that is dogmatic and
abstract. They write as if only the most explicit and self-conscious con-
sent5 8 will work to achieve-well, to achieve what, exactly? Whence
comes this passion for greater (albeit uneven) consensualism?
It is hard to find here a satisfying answer. One can consider the pos-
sibilities. At one point, noting that modern U.S. citizenship doctrine has
elements of both ascription and consensualism, the authors suggest that
the mix has been based largely on "expediency." Furthermore, the
"price we pay for that inconsistency may be increasing." 59 This warning
would carry more impact if it did not turn out that their solution is also a
mix (an expedient mix?) of ascription and consent, although placing
more emphasis on consensualism. In any event, when they come to con-
sider at length those mounting costs in Chapter Four, the only concrete
discussion relates to illegal immigration. For reasons indicated earlier,
little of the societal cost stemming from such migration should be
55. Professors Schuck and Smith evidently believe that adequate notice of the full implica-
tions of renunciation will avert the worst results-that is, that few persons will accept the
invitation and renounce their citizenship, at least without moving away. Pp. 123-24. Even if
one shires that belief, resting policy on such guesswork is a risky way to proceed.
56. P. 125.






attributed to the birthright citizenship rules, and little of it will be cured
by greater consensualism in the form they advocate.60
At another point, the authors suggest that "discriminatory impulses
and measures" aimed at immigrants or their descendants may be "partly
fueled by the belief that many [in such groups] should not have been
allowed to become citizens in the first place. '61 Perhaps. But there is no
direct evidence of such a fuel line. In any case, people stirred by such
bitter impulses would probably maintain their resentment even if one
could point to a congressional statute that manifested some more explicit
consent to those groups' citizenship. The discriminator's objection to
such groups' membership, one senses, is more basic.
Perhaps the best explanation for the book's strong tendency toward
consensualism can be found in the passages that open and close its pages.
The consensual ideal of citizenship, the authors assert, would be "more
likely to generate a genuine sense of community among all citizens than
the existing scheme."' 62 Later they write that the United States, under
more thoroughgoing consensual rules, "could more persuasively invoke
what it now can only baldly assert-a legitimacy grounded in a fresh,
vital, and always revocable consent."' 63 To my ear, these passages have
an anachronistic ring. They seem to express sentiments more appropri-
ate to the fractious years of the 1960's or early 1970's, when Dali wrote,
than to Ronald Reagan's 1980's.
V.
Anachronism or not, there is a more fundamental objection. The
quoted passages reflect an incomplete view of the wellsprings of both
community and legitimacy. Both may be nurtured by consent, but they
do not rest exclusively on consensualism.64 Perhaps Professors Schuck
and Smith have been overly captivated by the demands of the duality-
ascription versus consent-with which they begin. That dichotomy is a
60. At times, the book is surprisingly candid about this: "[T]he role of birthright citizen-
ship for the children of illegal and nonimmigrant aliens-the decision either to grant or with-





64. For discussions of the extent to which community rests on common purposes and
devotion to the same principles (roughly speaking, a consensual basis) or rather derives from a
shared history or coincidence of sentiment fostered by organic growth (something of an ascrip-
tive notion), see H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 134-39 (1980); Friedrich, The Concept of Community in the History of Political and
Legal Philosophy, in II NoMos: COMMUNITY 3-24 (C. Friedrich ed. 1959); Karst, Equality and
Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183, 183-86 (1980).
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useful analytical construct, but it does not divide the universe as sharply
and abstractly as the authors would sometimes have us believe.
Consent is basic to certain aspects of democracy, and especially Amer-
ican democracy, but it is not the only principle, and in any event it is
more complex and nuanced than the authors acknowledge. Alexander
Bickel, in his DeVane Lectures, published under the title The Morality of
Consent, reflected on this theme. In the excerpt below, he focussed spe-
cifically on the inadequacy of periodic elections as a complete reflection
of the sort of consent that underlies any institution's legitimacy. Change
the meaning slightly-assume that the key words connote the "election"
Professors Schuck and Smith would thrust upon eighteen-year-olds, to
decide whether or not to retain membership in the polity-and it may be
read as a potent objection to the proposals in this book:
The fundamental point was, and remains, that consent and stability are
not produced simply by the existence and function of popularly elected in-
stitutions, although absolute power may be. Elections, even if they are ref-
erenda, do not establish consent, or do not establish it for long. They
cannot mean that much ....
The people, as [Edmund] Burke used the term, was a body in place, gath-
ered, led, manifesting its temper in many ways and over a span of time as a
whole, or as one or another sizable community within the whole body, not
speaking merely on occasion in momentary numerical majorities. The in-
fluence of the people, so conceived, must be a dominant one because their
consent is essential. That consent may be withdrawn regardless of elec-
tions; it must be preponderant, not merely majority consent, and is yielded
not only and not even chiefly to the electoral verdict, but to institutions
validated by time and familiarity .... 65
Time and familiarity weave their way into the complex relationship we
call citizenship. Their significance fits comfortably with ascriptive citi-
zenship rules, at least as long as ascription is not irrevocable. Most of us
were simply born into our most basic affiliations-family, religion, na-
tion. Those ties are not only objects of choice; to a significant extent they
are constitutive of one's basic identity, anterior to choice. They help
shape the characteristics of mind, preference, and perception that one
brings to any particular consensual decision. 66 Later we may exercise a
"consensual" power to change some of those affiliations or preferences,
but such choices reflect an organic process, not the radical act of a
65. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16-18 (1975).
66. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982); Martin, Due
Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITr.
L. REv. 165, 216-18 (1983); Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12




sovereign individual able to sweep away all such prior attachments by
one magisterial act of consent or non-consent.
Ascriptive citizenship rules, especially generous ones, recognize this
reality. They anchor choice-the consensualist political process-in a
realistic and protective framework. One does not come into the political
world as a naked and lonely individual, wholly dependent for the honor-
ing of one's claims on consensual arrangements that might or might not
be worked out with other contracting individuals or associations. 67
Ascription, as the authors occasionally seem ready to recognize, serves to
protect fundamental human rights. Indeed, the very notion of basic
human rights applicable to all, alien or citizen, is fundamentally ascrip-
tive; it suggests a list of entitlements that one may claim simply by reason
of birth as a human being and not by reason of compact. The concept of
human rights thus places certain claims beyond the reach of other indi-
viduals' refusals to consent.
Certainly, after a person's basic affiliative foundation is established,
consent plays a significant role. Consent guards the outer boundaries of
legitimacy, even if it does not initially give birth to that sentiment, by
providing a fundamental check against abuses by the polity of which one
finds oneself a member. Consent can be withdrawn either collectively
through revolution or individually by renunciation of citizenship and re-
moval from the society. However, it is illusory to think that such a radi-
cal withdrawal of consent can be made so rationalistic and apparently
cost-free. 68
Professors Schuck and Smith sometimes disparage the ascriptive prin-
ciple as "medieval," "feudal," a "bastard concept," or a "vestigial rem-
nant."' 69 Ascription without an individual right to withdraw consent
may deserve those epithets. But American citizenship rules had worked
free of that taint at least as early as 1868. Modem citizenship rules,
through a painful process of trial and error in Congress and the Supreme
67. For a vision of the dangers once the anchor of such citizenship comes loose, see H.
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 293-302 (1966).
68. Even the Declaration of Independence, invoked by the authors as a consensualist docu-
ment, reflects a much more measured view of the role of consent and the appropriate occasion
for its withdrawal. After the famous passage stating that "to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," the
Declaration continues: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath
shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right them-
selves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." The Declaration of Indepen-
dence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
69. Pp. 2, 90, 116.
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Court, have now crystallized in a humane mixture of ascription and con-
sent. The ascriptive elements that survive do so for good and protective
reasons.
VI.
Professors Schuck and Smith's strong tendency toward consensualism
underestimates the value of ascription rightly applied. They write in the
context of a debate over illegal migration, however, that often tends to
undervalue consent-societal consent. Although I disagree with the au-
thors' precise recommendations, I applaud them for a courageous effort
to argue that society deserves to make choices about future members-
and should be making them now in a calm and serious way, lest we find
ourselves forced to make harsher decisions in future years, in a more
alarmist atmosphere.
It is not wrong, the authors say, for a democratic polity to make delib-
erate decisions about new membership applications from outside, most
fundamentally to preserve the degree of cohesion required by the demo-
cratic process itself, but also (and more problematically) to preserve the
character of the kind of community we have chosen and are choosing to
be.70 The authors are right to insist on the legitimacy of deliberate
choice.
This is sometimes a hard message for Americans to accept. We are
continuously reminded that we are a nation of immigrants. Most current
members of the polity descend from people who established their mem-
bership under a set of rules that consented to virtually unlimited immi-
gration. Such a tradition generates a vague feeling of guilt whenever
serious immigration enforcement is contemplated or carried out. It has
helped block the adoption, to date, of careful legislative proposals to curb
illegal migration. It contributes to paralyzing swings in policy between
toughness and leniency, and it sends mixed signals to the demoralized
agency that is asked to carry out America's uncertain policy. 71 At times,
it seems, we cannot quite bring ourselves to affirm that we are entitled to
close the doors to some who want to come- that is, to withhold consent
to the membership applications of aspirants who fail to meet our
70. For discussion of these points, see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 61-
80; M. WALZER, supra note 2, at 61-62.
71. See M. MORRIS, IMMIGRATIoN-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 121-23 and




established criteria-even when, in a broader perspective, our provisions
for legal admissions remain quite generous. 72
Consensualism's "exclusionary, repressive potential" 73 is most pro-
nounced when society excludes those who realistically have no home
elsewhere and therefore deserve the status of member in the only national
society to which they are connected. This was the essential vice of Elk v.
Wilkins and Dred Scott. A cutback in birthright citizenship, as Professors
Schuck and Smith advocate, risks inflicting the same kind of harm.
There are, however, other ways of implementing society's membership
choices.
Michael Walzer, in a penetrating essay on the relationship of justice to
membership decisions, has pointed out that such decisions operate at two
levels. "First admissions" occur at the point when outsiders enter for a
(relatively) permanent stay, de facto or de jure. They become, for some
purposes at least, functioning members of the society. "Second admis-
sions" are admissions to full political membership-the kinds of admis-
sions governed by naturalization rules rather than by immigration
rules.74 Society's asserted power to withhold consent to membership is
far less disturbing if it results only in a deliberate effort to "exclude"
from permanent membership those born elsewhere, already enjoying an-
other national affiliation-and before the time when lengthy presence
generates significant affiliative ties to this country. Societal consent, in
short, should take effect through a firm insistence on choice at the point
of initial entry for residence purposes, not at the point of political
72. Recent, and perhaps surprising, calls for essentially open borders include Machan,
Don't Close the Door, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1984, at A23, col. 3; Lane, Open the Door, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1985, at 20.
73. P. 63. See supra note 48.
74. In the course of discussing the legitimacy of guest worker programs, Walzer
elaborates:
[The principle of political justice is this: that the processes of self-determination through
which a democratic state shapes its internal life, must be open, and equally open, to all
those men and women who live within its territory, work in the local economy, and are
subject to local law. Hence, second admissions (naturalization) depend on first admis-
sions (immigration) and are subject only to certain constraints of time and qualification,
never to the ultimate constraint of closure. When second admissions are closed, the polit-
ical community collapses into a world of members and strangers, with no political bound-
aries between the two, where the strangers are subjects of the members. Among
themselves, perhaps, the members are equal, but it is not their equality but their tyranny
that determines the character of the state. Political justice is a bar to permanent alien-
age-either for particular individuals or for a class of changing individuals. At least, this
is true in a democracy.
M. WALZER, supra note 2, at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
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membership-at the point of "first admissions" rather than the "second
admissions" stage represented by citizenship. 75
American immigration law manifests that approach in theory. It con-
centrates controls at the immigration stage and opens naturalization on
routine and generous terms for those who choose to seek it after five
years of lawful residence. In application, however, American law fails to
carry through on this promise, precisely because of societal ambivalence
about immigration controls.
If we are not to choose a regime of open borders, we need to overcome
that ambivalence. In the pessimistic view, such a change will not come
unless crisis provokes a harsh backlash and a draconian enforcement re-
gime. I would like to think that a more optimistic possibility exists. Per-
haps the American ambivalence could be tamed by reflection on the
nature of societal consent and the foundations of its validity in the
crowded world we now inhabit, at least if any withholding of consent is
enforced humanely and at the proper stage. Patient explorations of the
legitimacy of societal choices about membership, like that offered in this
book, may contribute toward that end.
75. At times, Professors Schuck and Smith are certainly cognizant of this point of view.
See, e.g., p. 40. They, too, would emphasize better policing of first admissions. P. 5.
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